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Abstract. This paper addresses the use of dispositions in the Infectious
Disease Ontology (IDO). IDO is an ontology constructed according to the
principles of the Open Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and uses the
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as an upper ontology. After providing a brief
introduction to disposition types in BFO and IDO, we discuss three general
techniques for representing combinations of dispositions under the head-
ings blocking dispositions, complementary dispositions, and collective dispositions.
Motivating examples for each combination of dispositions is given along
with a specific use case in IDO. Description logic restrictions are used to
formalize statements relating to these combinations.
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1. Introduction: IDO, BFO, and OGMS
The Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO) provides a consistent terminology, taxon-
omy, and logical representation for the domain of infectious diseases. IDO con-
sists of a core ontology (henceforth “IDO Core”) intended to cover terms com-
mon to all infectious diseases (e.g., ‘host’, ‘pathogen’, ‘infection’, ‘immunity’),
and a suite of extension ontologies for specific diseases (e.g., Influenza, HIV,
Malaria). The purpose of the IDO Core is to ensure that the extension ontologies
created in its terms are interoperable. IDO Core is designed to be disease- and
pathogen-neutral and to represent entities and relations across three dimensions:
• biological scale: gene, cell, organ, organism, population
• disciplinary perspective: clinical, biological, epidemiological
• host, pathogen, and vector organism type: human, rat, pig, maize, HIV, in-
fluenza, mosquito.
Both the IDO Core and its extensions will adhere to the guidelines and best
practices of the OBO (Open Biomedical Ontology) Foundry ontologies. As such
IDO depends on the Basic Formal Ontology2 (BFO) as its upper ontology.
1Corresponding Author: Albert Goldfain, Blue Highway LLC, 2-212 Center for Science &
Technology Syracuse, New York 13244-4100; E-mail: agoldfain@blue-highway.com.
2http://www.ifomis.org/bfo
In the early stages of developing IDO, we discovered that BFO disposi-
tions were of central importance in representing relationships between hosts and
pathogens. The philosophical literature is rich with analyses of dispositions, el-
ements of which we believe can be fruitfully applied in developing ontologies
that capture relations between biological entities which involve an element of
ability or tendency.
In the next two sections, we describe the treatment of dispositions in BFO
and IDO and present a simple conditional analysis of dispositions. We spend the
remainder of the paper describing and formalizing different types of interactions
between dispositions.
2. BFO Dispositions
BFO embraces a distinction between categorical properties (e.g., triangularity)
and dispositional properties (e.g., fragility). BFO makes this distinction by parti-
tioning specifically dependent continuants (i.e., individual entities that depend
for their existence on a specific bearer) into qualities (categorical properties) and
realizable entities (including dispositional properties and roles). The relevant
BFO definitions are as follows:
Quality =de f A specifically dependent continuant that is exhibited if it inheres in an
entity or entities at all (a categorical property).
Realizable Entity =de f A specifically dependent continuant that inheres in indepen-
dent continuant entities and is not exhibited in full at every time in which it inheres
in an entity or group of entities.
Realization =de f A process in which a realizable entity is exhibited or manifested.
For the present paper, the only realizable entities we will concern ourselves with
are dispositions[3]3, defined in BFO as follows:
Disposition =de f A disposition is a realizable entity which is such that, if it
ceases to exist, then its bearer is physically changed, and whose realization
occurs in virtue of the bearer’s physical make-up when this bearer is in some
special circumstances.
Unlike roles, dispositions are not optional for the entities that bear them. If an
entity is a certain way, then it has a certain disposition, and if it ceases to be
that way, then it loses that disposition. A disposition is thus also known as
an internally-grounded realizable entity. That is, it is a realizable entity that is
a reflection of the in-built or acquired physical make-up of the independent
continuant that is its bearer.
By making both qualities and dispositions first-class entities, BFO implicitly
rejects both categorical monism, the view that all properties are categorical, and
dispositional monism, the view that all properties are dispositional. We embrace
the view that a disposition will only inhere in a bearer at a given time in virtue
3Dispositions are further subdivided into capabilities and functions in BFO; anything said about
dispositions in this paper also applies to the subtypes.
of the qualities of the bearer at that time: every disposition is in need of some
categorical base. Collectively, it is certain qualities inhering in parts the entity
has (for example of molecular structure) which form the physical basis for each
given disposition, and we can say that they confer the disposition on the bearer.
Reference to both qualities (such as mass and temperature) and dispositions
(such as solubility) has explanatory value in scientific theories, and the conferring
qualities are a good way to differentiate dispositions from one another. Thus, a
change in qualities (in physical structure) may imply a change in, gain, or loss of
a disposition. Also, dispositions may be borne without ever being manifested.
As part of its realist orientation, BFO attempts to avoid treatments of modality
(necessity, possibility) in terms of special entities such as possible worlds in favor
of a focus on objects existing in the present, actual world. Dispositions provide a
formal mechanism for taking account of future manifestations (BFO occurrents)
in terms of what is true of the underlying independent continuants in the present;
roughly, dispositions say how something is in terms of what it has the built-in
potential to do or suffer.
IDO subscribes to a dispositional model of disease provided by the Ontology
for General Medical Science4 (OGMS). In OGMS, every disease is a disposition
towards pathological processes whose physical basis is a disorder and whose
realization is a disease course. Some but not all manifestations of the disease
disposition become clinically significant in the sense that they occur with signs
and symptoms accessible to the patient or the clinician[1]. IDO inherits these
relationships between entities as follows:
bfo:processual_entity ogms:disease_course
is_a
oo ido:infectious_disease_course
is_a
oo
bfo:disposition
realized_by
OO
disposition_o f

ogms:disease
is_a
oo ido:infectious_disease
is_a
oo
bfo:material_entity ogms:disorder
is_a
oo ido:infection
is_a
oo
The relevant OGMS definitions are as follows:
Disorder =de f A disorder is a material entity which is clinically abnormal and which
is a fiat object part of the whole formed by: (1) an organism, (2) material entities
adhering to the organism, and (3) any material entities located within the convex hull
of the organism (e.g., the bloodstream, the gut, the lungs).
Disease =de f A disposition (i) to undergo pathological processes that (ii) exists in an
organism because of one or more disorders in that organism.
Disease Course =de f The totality of all processes through which a given disease
instance is realized.
And the relevant IDO definitions hanging from these OGMS terms are as
follows:
4http://code.google.com/p/ogms/
Infection =de f A disorder which has as part a population of organisms with a collec-
tive pathogenic disposition.
Infectious Disease =de f A disease whose physical basis is an infection.
InfectiousDiseaseCourse=de f A disease course that is the realization of an infectious
disease.
Taking diseases to be dispositions highlights the fact that they can be present
without manifestation (i.e., without realization of the disposition) and that they
can be realized in multiple different sorts of manifestations (dependent for ex-
ample on presence or absence of symptom-suppressant drugs). Resort to dispo-
sitions thus allows us to describe what an object can do and to have this descrip-
tion still be correct even if relevant realizing processes never take place. This is
obviously a great advantage in an area such as immunology, where the object of
our study involves structures in the body designed precisely to prevent certain
categories of processes. Diseases inhere in organisms with disorders, not solely
in the disorders, since there may be parts of the organism aside from the disorder
that participate in the disease course. For infectious diseases in particular, we do
not want to localize the disease in the disorder since the infection is actually not
a part of the diseased organism.
Diseases, like all dispositions, are often detected and understood through the
examination of their manifestation. Beyond the infectious disease course, IDO
recognizes several subprocesses of host-pathogen interaction, depicted in Figure
1.
Figure 1. The IDO process model.
A disposition D is only added to IDO Core when D picks out a biologi-
cally recognized property and we are able to specify the IDO process type for
manifestations of its instances. Even though biological reality may be such as to
contain a disposition towards any logical combination of processes, we feel that
IDO should only contain those sparse dispositions most relevant to modelling
infectious disease.
In what follows, the use of IDO dispositions is formalized using description
logic restrictions. Ultimately, the full IDO suite of ontologies will require a more
expressive logic for comprehensive reasoning5, but we would like to deploy de-
scription logic wherever possible since it is the foundation of the decidable rea-
soning in OWL DL. Wherever possible, relations from the OBO Relation Ontol-
ogy (RO) or the proposed extension of this ontology6 (RO-Proposed) are used in
order to avoid the proliferation of new relations and to remain compatible with
OBO ontologies. Unless otherwise specified, all relations used in this paper relate
universals (types).
The syntax and semantics of the description logic expressions we will use
for DL concept descriptions C,D (classes in OWL, universals in BFO), DL role R
(relation in OWL, type-level OBO relation in BFO), interpretation I, and domain
of interpretation ∆I are as follows:
Name Syntax Semantics
Intersection C u D C∩D
Union C unionsq D C∪D
Value Restriction ∀R C {a ∈ ∆I|∀b.(a,b) ∈ RI→ b ∈ CI}
Existential Quantification ∃R C {a ∈ ∆I|∃b.(a,b) ∈ RI∧b ∈ CI}
Empty Restriction C = ∅ |C| = 0
Concept Inclusion C vD CI ⊆DI
Concept Equality C ≡D CI = DI
Only the empty restriction is nonstandard, and it can be expressed in terms of a
qualified cardinality restriction.
3. The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions
A starting point for the logical analysis of dispositions is the simple conditional
analysis. Bird presents the simple conditional analysis as follows ([5] p. 24): Let
’D(S,M)’ abbreviate ’x is disposed to manifest M in response to stimulus S, and
’’ symbolize the subjunctive/counterfactual conditional, so that SxMx if x
were S then it would be M, then the (simple) conditional analysis of dispositions
may be symbolized:
D(S,M)x↔ SxMx
The simple conditional analysis fails in two ways. In the case of what are
called finkish dispositions[7], the causal basis for manifestation is removed after the
5Most likely, IDO axioms will need a suitable rule language and second-order logic
6http://www.obofoundry.org/ro/
stimulus Sx is applied, but before manifestation Mx can occur, thus violating the
counterfactual. Dispositions frequently take time to manifest after the stimulus is
applied, so there is a chance that the disposition may be lost during this time. Bird
provides an example particularly relevant for our purposes: “Some food might
become infected with the bacterium Clostridium botulinum and thereby become
poisonous. It can lose that disposition [to poison] by cooking or irradiation” [4].
The simple conditional analysis also fails in the case of antidotes (or masks) to a
disposition. In this case the disposition is left intact after the stimulus is applied,
but the manifestation fails to occur because of external conditions. Bird puts it
as follows: “When an antidote is present an object can have a disposition to M
when S yet fail to yield M when given stimulus S, because the conditions that, in
conjunction with the disposition’s causal basis, would normally bring M about,
have been interfered with” [4]. For example, a small forest fire that is contained
by firefighters still bears the disposition to burn down the entire forest, but it
cannot manifest that disposition because it is contained.
In the philosophical literature on dispositions, it is customary to discuss such
background conditions, circumstances, contexts, or laws of nature. Mumford
makes an important distinction between two types of background conditions:
α-conditions: being conditions that prevent the manifestation of a disposition though the
disposition itself remains, for example: lack of oxygen prevents a struck match from
lighting though it remains flammable; the lack of a mate prevents a man from breeding
though he remains fertile; placing a vase in a sturdy glass prevents it from being
broken though it remains fragile.
β-conditions: being conditions that prevent something from having a disposition, for exam-
ple: a match being wet stops it being flammable; a zero or low sperm count stops a
male from being fertile; a strengthening process stops a vase from being fragile ([9]
p. 86).
These conditions correspond nicely to antidotes and finkish dispositions respec-
tively.
While this machinery is often only used only to discredit the simple condi-
tional analysis, it can also be used to describe relationships between dispositions.
Background conditions, external circumstances, and laws of nature can all be
construed in a dispositional way. Sometimes these dispositions block each other,
complement each other, or are manifested in a collective way. We will spend the
remainder of the paper examining these dispositional relationships.
4. Blocking Dispositions
Special emphasis must be placed on the fact that what is often preventing the
manifestation of a disposition is the manifestation of another disposition. We
will call the latter a blocking disposition and the former a blocked disposition. For
example, a particular carnivorous predator with a disposition to eat a particular
prey animal blocks predators of the same type from manifesting the same type
of disposition (assuming that the particular prey animal is the only one readily
available). In general, if D1 is a disposition and D2 is a blocking disposition for D1,
then it must be the case that the manifestation of D2 prevents the manifestation
of D1. A blocking disposition might be understood in different ways:
1. Incompatible occurrents: The manifestation of D1 and the manifestation
of D2 are somehow incompatible occurrents, meaning either that they
cannot co-occur or that one negatively regulates7 the other.
2. Incompatible qualities: The manifestation of D2 results in a continuant’s
acquring a quality that is incompatible with some quality that the same
continuant would have acquired through the manifestation of D1. That
is, we have two qualities that cannot be simultaneously exhibited (e.g., a
square circular object).
We utilize blocking dispositions in IDO to describe the general phenomena
of protective resistance. By giving resistance a positive characterization, in which
we describe what dispositions are actively manifested, descriptions of resistance
can play a more explanatory role in explanations and query answering. The
current IDO Core definition of protective resistance is as follows:
Protective Resistance=de f A disposition that inheres in a material entity (x) by virtue
of the fact that the entity has a part (e.g., a gene product), which itself has a disposition
(1) to ensure a physiologic response of a certain degree to an entity with the capability
to damage x, or (2) to prevent the completion of some process caused by an entity
with the capability to damage x.
The prevented process referred to in clause (2) must be critical to how the damag-
ing entity would damage x. For example, there may be several processes caused
by an infectious organism that are prevented by the host, but this prevention does
not result in resistance because the completion of these processes isn’t necessary.
It is only certain critical processes whose prevention results in resistance.
An example of protective resistance is the resistance of MRSa to the antibiotic
methicillin. Without blocking dispositions, we can describe this resistance by
noting the lack of affinity to methicillin (a disposition) in the penicillin-binding
protein of MRSa (PBP2a). As an explanation of why MRSa is resistant, invoking
the lack of affinity to methicillin seems to be begging the question however.
MRSa is resistant to methicillin because one of its parts lacks an affinity for it.
The same situation can be described in a positive (active) way by considering the
disposition of PBP2a to synthesize peptidoglycan (an essential component of the
bacterial cell wall) as a blocking disposition for the disposition of methicillin to
bind to penicillin-binding proteins.8 In this way, protective resistance is seen as
an active response to methicillin [6].
In this situation, we can argue for incompatible occurrents: the process of
cell wall construction (as a manifestation of the typical disposition of PBP) is
incompatible with the process of methicillin binding (which is the manifestation
of affinity to methicillin that PBP2a lacks). We could also argue for incompatible
qualities: for a particular peptidoglycan molecule, being part of a lattice is incom-
patible with being bound by methicillin.9 As a result, the molecular structure of a
well-formed bacterial cell wall (i.e., a peptidoglycan lattice) is incompatible with
7The RO Proposed relation P1negatively_regulatesP2 holds between processes P1 and P2 when
the unfolding of P1 decreases the frequency, rate, or extent of P2.
8Note that since we are dealing with the impossibility of co-occurrence, we could also take the
disposition to bind to PBP as a blocking disposition for the disposition to synthesize peptidoglycan.
9This could also be framed as an incompatibility of spatial co-location.
the molecular structure of a compound sufficiently bound to methicillin. Cell
wall construction is something a bacteria will participate in when no methicillin
is present. In order to see this typical cellular process as an active response, we
need the machinery of blocking dispositions. Protective resistance to methicillin
is exhibited by MRSa in the process of cell wall construction by blocking the
disposition of methicillin to bind to PBP.
It is easiest to formulate blocking dispositions in description logic via the
RO_Proposed relation negatively_regulates
D2_blocking_disposition_of _D1 ≡
∃realized_by(∃negatively_regulates D1u ∃realizes D2)
But we may also describe the inability for D1 and D2 to co-occur at time T using
a cardinality restriction:10
∃realizes D1u ∃realizes D2u ∃occurs_at T = ∅
Description logic does not provide schema variables in the way we have used
them in D2 blocking_disposition_of D1, so each such disposition must be fleshed
out in concrete terms by the relevant IDO extension ontologies. In the case
of MRSa, for example, the disposition of PBP2a to construct a cell wall is a
blocking_disposition_of the disposition to bind to methicillin, because con-
structing a cell wall negatively regulates binding to methicillin in the case of
PBP2a. In the case of MSSa (Methicillin-susceptible Staph aureus), the disposition
of PBP to bind to methicillin is a blocking_disposition_of the disposition to
construct a cell wall, because binding to methicillin negatively regulates cell wall
construction.
Such an analysis is not without its problems. One minor concern is that calling
something a blocking disposition may be considered too perspectival, biasing
the ontological term towards D1 being blocked by rather than blocking D2. A
more serious problem is how can we empirically distinguish between something
not happening to a specific continuant as the result of (1) an external blocking
disposition or (2) as the result of its own internal makeup.
A further worry involves the identity criteria for blocking dispositions. Storm-
resistant walls on a particular house are most likely also lemonade-resistant as
well, but in virtue of the same underlying structure (i.e., categorical properties).
So is the particular lemonade resistance inhering in those walls identical to the
particular water resistance inhering in those walls? It seems counterintuitive to
say so, but if we say these are not identical we open the door to a combinatorial
explosion of resistance dispositions. Similarly, penicillin binding protein has an
affinity to penicillin (as its name suggestes) which is conferred by the same
qualities that yield methicillin resistance, but we do not want to say that these
forms of resistance are identical because some staph aureus may be susceptible to
methicillin but resistant to penicillin. We can quell this combinatorial explosion
of dispositions by considering the evolutionary selection (in biology) and artifact
10By our notational convention, ∅ denotes a cardinality of 0
design decisions (in the cases like storm resistant walls) that identify the entities
reasons-for-existing (and thus their functions). These strategies are especially
important when reasoning about resistance.
5. Complementary Dispositions
In addition to blocking each other, dispositions can also manifest in comple-
mentary ways. This is most evident with those dispositions that happen to be
functions. Man-made tools have certain functions because they were designed
for complementary manifestation with the functions of other tools (e.g., the func-
tions of hammers and nails, locks and keys). Biological functions, like artifac-
tual functions, evolve in complementary dependence upon each other (e.g., the
functions of sperm and egg cells).
A certain key K has a disposition DK to unlock a certain lock L, while the lock
L has a disposition DL to be unlocked by K. Both DK and DL are manifested in the
same process, namely, K’s unlocking of L. What underlies these complementary
dispositions is the key’s disposition to transmit torque when rotated, the lock’s
disposition to release when unlatched, and a relation between the qualities (i.e.,
shapes) of the lock and key that confers these dispositions (i.e., the key’s fitting
the lock). In order to see that DK and DL are not the same disposition, we can
consider the different ways in which the unlocking process might fail. The key’s
shape may erode and no longer fit the lock, in which case DK is lost, but DL
remains. The lock may rust to such a degree that DL is lost, but DK remains.
Martin uses the phrase ’reciprocal disposition partners for mutual manifes-
tation’ to describe such paired dispositions and advocates the use of such pairs
to replace cause and effect in scientific explanation [2]. Bird suggests that dispo-
sitions might always come in reciprocal pairs [5]. Under this analysis, there are
two distinct dispositions in our example, one inhering in the key and the other
inhering in the lock, but they are both manifested in the same process (instance).
However, other analyses are possible:
1. Whole with a Single Disposition: A mereological whole W which has
parts K and L has a single disposition D. For example, if W = K +L (where
’+’ denotes mereological sum) then we can say W has the disposition to
undergo an unlocking process (in virtue of an intrinsic quality of W (i.e., the
relative shapes of its parts K and L). We do not prefer this analysis because
there may be many key copies (and indeed many lock copies) made such
that all keys fit all locks. We then would have a generic dependence
involving a relative shape quality whose bearer would be very difficult to
specify.
2. Whole with a Collective Disposition: A mereological whole W = K + L
in which K has disposition DK and L has disposition DL and the whole
has disposition D = DK +d DL. Of course, such an account would need to
define a mereological sum ’+d’for dispositions since parthood between
dispositions is less clearly defined than parthood between independent
continuants and parthood between occurrents. We will discuss something
similar in the next section, but we can think of this account treating D as
the total manifestation of DK and DL.
The terminology of complementary dispositions is useful in representing
symbiotic relationships between organisms. It is used by IDO to describe the
properties of interacting hosts and infectious organisms. ’Host’, ’pathogen’, ’in-
fectious organism11’, ’mutualist’, and ’commensal’ are all BFO roles in IDO.
The dispositional relationship between a host and an infectious organism
works very much like a lock and key in that the success of a host-pathogen
interaction process (e.g., transmission, symbiosis, or any of the subprocesses from
Figure 1) depends on the possession and manifestation of certain dispositions.
Two such dispositions are the ’infectious disposition’ and the ’capability to play
the host role’. The relevant IDO definitions are as follows:
Pathogenic Disposition=de f The disposition to cause disease in an organism of a
certain type.
Infectious Disposition =de f A disposition that inheres in an organism and is the
disposition to be transmitted to another organism of a certain type and to establish
an infection in that organism.
Capability to Play the Host Role =de f The disposition to participate in symbiosis as
host with another organism of a certain type.
Infectious Organism Role =de f A parasite role borne by an organism (x) of type X
that has the infectious disposition relative to an organism of type Y, by virtue of the
fact that: (1) x is participating in symbiosis (GO:0044403) with an organism of type Y,
and (2) a infectious disease caused by X can be realized in Y.
Host Role=de f A role borne by an organism by virtue of the fact that it is participating
in a process of symbiosis (GO:0044403), it is the larger of the organisms participating
in the symbiosis, and it provides an environment or nutrient resources in or on itself
for the survival of its partner in symbiosis.
The infectious disposition and the capability to play the host role are complemen-
tary dispositions realized during symbiosis. Like the unlocking process above,
a symbiosis process may fail if, for example, the host cannot provide enough
nutrients for the infectious organism to ensure its survival or because the host is
immune.
Description logic does not permit a perspicuous representation of comple-
mentary dispositions in terms of the dispositions themselves. In order to cap-
ture two dispositions oriented “towards” each other with a potential for mu-
tual manifestation, we must place restrictions on the continuants and occurrents
involved. We represent complementary dispositions inhering in continuants C1
and C2 whose mutual manifestation process is P using the following restriction
on P:
P ≡ ∃realizes∃disposition_of C1u∃realizes∃disposition_ofC2
11There are subtle distinctions between the pathogen role and the infectious organism role, but
since our primary concern here is dispositions, we will ignore these distinctions for simplicity.
P is equivalent to the type of process that is the realization of dispositions of both
C1 and C2. In IDO, this establishes a network-of-restrictions representation for
complementary dispositions.
Infectious_Disease_Course v
∃realizes∃disposition_of∃role_of Infectious_Organism u
∃realizes∃disposition_of∃role_of Host
In Figure 2, we illustrate how this restriction relates infectious organisms, hosts,
and infectious diseases.
Figure 2. DL restrictions for complementary dispositions in IDO.
6. Collective Dispositions
As we saw in the previous sections, two independent continuants can interact
through their disposition manifestations. A natural generalization of these ideas
is to drop the focus on two dispositions, and to consider processes involving the
collective manifestation of arbitrarily large aggregates of dispositions. Collec-
tives acquire dispositions not possessed by their individual constituents. This is
most clearly seen when we consider dispositions as capabilities. A crowd has the
collective capability to do the wave in virtue of each individual crowd member’s
capability to stand at the appropriate time. Two people have the collective capa-
bility to lift a w pound weight in virtue of the first person’s capability to lift w1
pounds and the second person’s capability to lift w2 pounds, where w = w1 +w2.
Sometimes collectives are identified by their capabilities. For example, a mob
of people is identified by a collectives ability (and intent) to do damage. Such
collective phenomena involve dispositions inhering in an aggregate of material
entities.
BFO makes a three way distinction between material entities: ’fiat object
part’, ’object’, and ’object aggregate’, and utilizes the theory of granular partitions
to handle issues of truth and reference at different granularities. What counts
as an ’object’ for a particular investigation is a matter of scale and is usually
determined by the perspective of the investigator:
Partitions are at work, we now want to claim, whenever judgments are effected in
relation to the empirical world of what happens and is the case. For a partition to do
its work, it needs to have cells large enough to contain the objects that are of interest
in the portion of reality which concerns the judging subject, but at the same time
these cells must somehow serve to factor out the details which are of no concern. A
partition, as here conceived, is accordingly a device for focusing upon what is salient
and also for masking what is not salient. [11] (p. 27)
The same material entity may be considered as an object or an aggregation of
(potentially heterogeneous) parts. To reason correctly in a certain context, it is
often essential to commit to one or the other perspective. This is evident with
the infectious disease domain, where, for example, an infection can be thought
of as a unified object in a clinical context, or as a collection of microorganisms in
a microbiological context.
To support broad reasoning at different granularities, we either need an
ontology of collectives (cf. [12]) or a formulation of which granular partitions
are in use. We do not claim that there are a fixed level of granularities or a fixed
number of granular partitions:
Sperm and eggs are both cells, but much of what we have to say about eggs pertains
to individual eggs, whereas much more that we have to convey about sperm concern
the collective, although we need a mechanism to cross levels of collectivity to speak of
a single sperm fertilizing a single egg. Indeed, one of the issues in fertility research is
to determine which factors depend on the collective of sperm and the fluids in which
they are swimming, and which depend on the individual sperm cells themselves.
Hence, we explicitly reject any notion of a fixed set of levels of granularity[10], (p.
336).
Here we will only focus on the differences between dispositions inhering in
objects of a certain type and those inhering in aggregates of those types of objects,
and the impact of these differences on reasoning. The RO does not have a specific
relation set aside for membership in an aggregation, which is a very specific
mereological relation, so we will recruit the part_of relation for our purposes.
The mereology of independent continuants and occurrents is more developed
than that of dependent continuants. We hold the view that any parthood relation
between dispositions (dependent continuants) must be couched in parthood
relations of their bearers (independent continuants) or in parthood relations
of their manifestations (occurrents). Each independent continuant may serve a
different role in the collective (e.g., a CEO and an assembly line worker are
both part of the same collective in different roles), but in IDO we are primarily
interested in organism populations of the same type of organism.
The manifestation of a collective disposition need not involve the manifes-
tation of the individual dispositions in unison, rather, complex behaviors may
be described in terms of complex patterns of manifestation. Also, we cannot
assume that transitivity of parthood implies a compositionality of dispositional
properties. A certain population may have a certain collective disposition but
may lose that disposition with the addition or removal of members (of the same
type) to that population. With these issues in mind, we formulate a definition of
collective disposition as follows:
Collective Disposition =de f A disposition inhering in an object aggregate OA in
virtue of the individual dispositions of the constituents of OA and that does not itself
inhere in any part of OA or in any larger aggregate in which OA is a part.
The definition purposefully underspecifies the relationship between the individ-
ual dispositions. The individual dispositions do not have to complement one
another (indeed, they may even block each other) in order for a collective dispo-
sition to inhere in the aggregate.
Collective dispositions can be used in IDO to define herd immunity:
Herd Immunity =de f A collective disposition that inheres in an organism population
by virtue of the fact that a sufficient number of members of the population have
immunity to an infectious organism thereby reducing transmission and protecting
non-immune members from the infectious organism population.
The organism population in which an instance of herd immunity inheres is
determined by its spatiotemporal arrangement. This population is composed of
members that are organisms of the same type, X, have the capability to play
the host of infectious agent role in symbiosis with an organism that has the
infectious disposition relative to X, and are frequent participants in processes
that would transmit the infectious organism between members of the population.
Herd immunity is an example of a collective disposition that may be lost if
more members are added to the population (in roughly the same spatiotemporal
region), specifically if non-immune members are added.
In order to represent collective dispositions in description logic, we first need
to consider whether a single disposition can cross scales. More formally, we need
to consider the range of the disposition_of relation and the domain of its inverse
relation has_disposition. Given X has_dispositionD we need to decide whether
any of X’s parts or anything in which X is a part can have the same disposition
type D. Formally,
∃has_disposition Du (∃part_of Xunionsq∃has_part X) ?= ∅
We favor a view in which the same disposition cannot cross granularities. Under
this view, no subpopulation S of an organism population P with herd immu-
nity has the same herd immunity, and no larger population L in which P is a
subpopulation has the same herd immunity.
An object aggregate C has collective disposition D if, assuming for all 1≤ i≤ n,
Pi is part of the process aggregate that realizes D
Pi ∈ ∃part_of∃realizesD
and there is a member of C with a disposition to manifest each Pi
∃part_of C u∃has_disposition∃realized_by Pi , ∅
If both conditions are satisfied then we can describe the constituents of C by:
∃part_of C u (∃has_disposition∃realized_by P1 unionsq
∃has_disposition∃realized_by P2 unionsq
...
unionsq ∃has_disposition∃realized_by Pn)
This restriction lets us reason over the parts of the aggregate that bears the
collective disposition.
7. Conclusion
Dispositions play a pivotal role in IDO by formally relating independent continu-
ants and the occurrents they can participate in. The causal relationships between
processes in the infectious disease domain are largely explained by dispositions.
We suspect that blocking dispositions, complementary dispositions, and collec-
tive dispositions will be particularly useful for biomedical ontologies and for any
ontology that needs to spell out how dispositions interact.
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